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AT A GLANCE
•• Over one million 
individuals die annually 
from malaria, and ninety 
percent of malaria-related 
deaths occur in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
•• Insecticide treated nets 
(ITNs) are extremely 
effective in preventing 
transmission of malaria. 
•• Financial constraints rather 
than a lack of concern 
about malaria play a 
primary role in a poor 
household’s decision not 
to purchase ITNs at the 
market price.
•• The majority of people 
who own freely distributed 
ITNs are unwilling to resell 
them at market price 
because they place a 
greater value on them 
than their market worth.
Imagine that your three-year-old child has a fever. The cause could be serious or a harmless flu. You 
don’t know the temperature, but your 
child feels awful. Unfortunately, a trip 
to the doctor might cost you three or 
four weeks’ worth of income, and you 
are struggling to feed and clothe your 
family as it is. Afraid to bring additional 
hardship to your home for a passing 
illness, you wait to see if your child 
recovers. A day later, the condition is 
worse. You spend the money to visit the 
nearest clinic. By then it may already be 
too late to save your child’s life.
This plight affects millions of 
households throughout the developing 
world. Malaria kills more than one 
million people each year, most of them 
children, with sub-Saharan Africa 
accounting for ninety percent of annual 
deaths. In addition to such high death 
tolls, high economic losses result from 
non-mortal cases. While treating the 
disease is costly, sickness also reduces 
individuals’ capacity to work and 
can force steep drops in income for 
households already in deep poverty.
Dr. Vivian Hoffmann researches 
the effectiveness of various policies 
that address this crippling public 
health problem as part of her work in 
the Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics at the University 
of Maryland. In recent work with Dr. 
Christopher Barrett and Dr. David Just 
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Insecticide treated nets (ITNs) are extremely effective in preventing transmission 
of malaria. 
Glance continued from page 1
•• Free distribution of ITNs 
will not incite large-scale 
reselling of nets or result 
in the undercutting of local 
net sellers and commercial 
market distribution.
at Cornell University, Hoffman notes 
that insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) are 
a very effective way to prevent and 
reduce malaria. Malaria is transmitted 
through mosquito bites, most often 
during the night when people sleep. 
Covering beds with nets treated by 
insecticide kills mosquitoes and 
prevents bites, and is therefore highly 
effective in stopping transmission of the 
disease. The problem is that households 
living on very little income may be 
unable to afford the cost of mosquito 
nets or the cost of travel to areas where 
they can be purchased. In addition, the 
lifespan of traditional ITNs is usually 
only a year, after which they should be 
replaced or re-treated with insecticide. 
While ITNs are widely considered 
the most cost-effective approach to 
fighting malaria, the best method for 
distributing ITNs in Africa is intensely 
debated. Proponents of market-based 
approaches fear that free distribution 
of nets will in fact be harmful in the 
long run. Since the cost is simply too 
high to cover all groups exposed to 
malaria through free distribution, they 
emphasize the large gap in need for 
ITNs that private markets are left to fill. 
They argue that free distribution will 
inhibit the emergence of these critical 
private markets. They also point out 
that sustainable solutions require the 
existence of local commercial markets 
for the nets. If these markets do not 
develop, communities will be left with 
even worse access if free distribution 
stops in the future.
Advocates of free distribution, 
however, similarly argue that 
commercial strategies by themselves 
will not be able to achieve high enough 
levels of coverage. Even when the price 
of nets is highly subsidized, many poor 
households still find the cost of ITNs 
too expensive. Commercial suppliers 
are also unlikely to expand access to 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
Free distribution 
of ITNs is a critical 
means to increase 
malaria prevention for 
the most vulnerable 
populations—very 
poor households with 
young children and 
pregnant women.
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From WHO World Malaria Report 2008. Only mean estimates reported (not upper and lower bounds). 
Note that cases per 100 people is not the same as percentage of people who had malaria at least once 
in the year, since one person can have multiple malaria cases in the same year
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remote areas if few households in those 
areas can afford the nets. Proponents 
of free distribution also emphasize the 
substantial indirect benefits provided to 
nearby non-users of ITNs, caused by 
the general reduction in overall 
infection rates in an area when 
mosquitoes are killed by the nets. 
Households will not take these indirect 
benefits into consideration in their ITN 
purchasing decisions, suggesting an 
important role for government or other 
outside assistance.
A critical question that may help 
move this issue forward is whether 
or not the free distribution of ITNs 
really has negative effects on the 
development of local markets. If not, 
the two approaches to ITN delivery may 
be compatible, and the most effective 
strategy may be a combination of 
both. Hoffman examined this question 
through recent field experiments she 
conducted in Uganda and found that 
free distribution is unlikely to have 
the negative effects feared.
The Social and Economic Costs 
of Malaria
The World Health Organization 
estimates that malaria killed nearly one 
million people in 2006. Eighty-five 
percent of those who died were children 
under the age of five. Africa accounts 
for roughly ninety percent of the world’s 
malaria burden.
The Potential Pitfalls of 
Free Distribution
In an article published with co-
authors Christopher Barrett and David 
Just in World Development, Hoffman 
explains why many people criticize the 
idea that free distribution of ITNs is 
the best way to improve reduce malaria 
infections in at-risk populations. There 
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From WHO World Malaria Report 2008. 
are in fact good reasons to question the 
effectiveness of free distribution. One 
problem is that target populations—very 
poor households with young children 
or pregnant women—may not be the 
ultimate users of goods that are freely 
distributed. If these households are 
not using ITNs in the first place, it is 
reasonable to believe they may resell 
them if received freely. Traditional 
economic theory suggests that if a 
person who is not willing to pay for 
a product at the current local price is 
given the product for free, he will prefer 
to sell it at the local price and use the 
money obtained in other ways.
For example, a poor household 
struggling to feed itself may care more 
about increasing the food intake of 
its children than protecting against 
mosquitoes. It may then sell freely 
given nets to a wealthier household 
in order to buy more food. While this 
may assist the initial household in some 
ways, it undermines the public health 
objective of reducing malaria. It also 
frustrates any attempts that may have 
been made to target specific “high-
risk” segments of a population. If many 
households resold their nets, it could 
cripple the potential overall impact 
of net-distribution projects and fail to 
protect the most vulnerable households.
Another issue is whether free 
distribution will prevent the 
development of local markets for ITNs, 
weakening the long-term sustainability 
of household ITN use and the benefits 
they bring. If many households resell 
nets they are freely given by aid 
agencies, this would create a secondary 
market for nets that may compete 
with locally sold nets and drive prices 
down. (A poor household receiving 
the net for free may be willing to sell 
it at a cheaper price than that charged 
by local net sellers in order to use the 
cash “windfall” for other essential 
purchases.) A similar concern is 
frequently raised in the context of 
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“Financial constaints 
rather than lack of 
concern about malaria 
prevention play a 
primary role in a poor 
household’s decision 
not to purchase ITNs 
at the market price.”
food-aid distribution. While 
presumably a good way to relieve 
hunger and improve food sufficiency 
for extremely poor households, a large 
supply of free food from aid agencies 
may drive prices down. This is good 
for poor farming households as buyers 
of food, but it is bad for them as sellers 
and depresses their incomes even 
further. In the context of mosquito 
nets, depressed local prices may hurt 
commercial sellers of mosquito nets 
enough that they decide not to sell 
them, causing the local ITN market 
to disappear. This would severely 
undermine sustainability objectives, 
creating dependence on donors and 
aid agencies for ITNs. If free 
distribution ever stops, access to nets 
may disappear.
Is Free Distribution Necessarily at 
Odds with Sustainability?
Hoffmann and her co-authors 
explain that there are also good 
reasons to believe that households—
even extremely poor ones—may not 
resell ITNs they are freely given. The 
first is that the failure of households 
to purchase ITNs at current local 
prices may not be an indication of a 
household’s lack of willingness to 
pay the local price. Rather, it may 
be an indication of the household’s 
lack of ability to pay that price. 
Many households in rural areas of 
the developing world have very tight 
financial constraints and little access to 
credit. This prevents them from being 
able to obtain goods or services they 
might be willing to purchase even if 
they had to borrow money (and incur an 
additional interest cost) in order to pay 
for them. 
Someone with enough cash on hand 
to easily cover the cost of an ITN, but 
who chooses not to buy one at local 
prices, clearly does not believe the net 
is worth the price being charged. Such a 
person could reasonably be expected to 
sell a freely given net for very close to 
the local price (since they value the net 
below that amount) and use that money 
to buy something else. Someone in deep 
poverty, however, may actually value a 
net above the price at which it is being 
sold locally, even if he does not buy 
one. He may simply have far too little 
income and other resources to cover the 
ITN purchase. When provided an ITN 
for free, this individual will not resell it, 
since the highest price he could receive 
is the local price, and he believes the 
net is worth more than that. If financial 
constraints and difficulty accessing 
loans (rather than lower valuations 
of nets) drive households’ failure to 
purchase ITNs, they will not sell freely 
given nets on secondary markets.
Another factor that may prevent 
households from reselling nets they 
are freely given is the “endowment 
effect”—an increasingly well-
documented divergence of behavior 
from standard economic theory. This 
effect refers to the observation that 
people apparently often value a good 
they already possess more than one they 
do not yet already own. For example, a 
OLYSET NET
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person may decide a non-owned net is 
worth five dollars. She would therefore 
be willing to pay up to five dollars, and 
no more, in order to obtain it; she will 
refuse to buy the net if it costs eight 
dollars from the local net sellers. Now 
imagine she is given the net for free. A 
second person searching for a good deal 
might offer to buy the net from her for 
seven dollars. According to traditional 
economic theory, the original recipient 
will sell the good and increase her net 
gain by two dollars. While this is good 
for the original recipient and the second 
person in terms of individual payoffs, it 
clearly hurts the local ITN industry and 
frustrates policy attempts to target the 
original recipient.
Surprisingly, however, economists are 
finding more and more evidence from 
lab experiments that individuals value 
owned and non-owned goods at different 
prices. This means people require more 
money to part with an item they already 
have than they would have been willing 
to give in order to buy it. In the example 
above, the person who valued a non-
owned net at five dollars might value 
the owned net at nine dollars. If so, 
even though this person refused to buy 
an eight-dollar net, she will only sell a 
freely given net for nine dollars or more. 
Clearly, if the local price is just eight 
dollars, no one will buy the net from 
her. The existence of an endowment 
effect thus also reduces the likelihood 
that free distribution will undercut the 
development of local markets.
A final factor that may inhibit any 
tendency for free distribution to create 
harmful secondary markets stems from 
differences within households in what 
each person believes a net is worth. 
In households with multiple decision-
makers, the recipient of a free ITN may 
value the net more than the household 
member responsible for purchases 
and other financial decisions. If the 
recipient of the free ITN has more 
control over how the net is used than 
the other household member, such a 
dynamic would increase the likelihood 
that households retain and use freely 
distributed nets. This may happen, for 
example, if men tend to control financial 
resources and women tend to value 
children’s health more and see ITNs as 
an investment in child health.
What’s Really Happening?
Hoffman and her colleagues 
found strong evidence that free ITN 
distribution will not induce secondary 
markets as feared. Their research was 
conducted in 2006 in remote villages 
of western Uganda. Locally purchased 
ITNs cost about $5.50, not including 
transportation time and cost. ITNs are 
only available in an urban center many 
hours from the research villages on foot, 
or reachable by a $7.50 motorcycle ride.
In the area they studied, ninety 
percent of household members suffer 
from malaria at least once a year. 
A single malaria episode is very 
expensive—costing on average of 
$17.85 in treatment expenses and 
lost labor income. This represents 7.2 
OLYSET NET
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“Free distribution of 
ITN’s will not incite 
large-scale reselling 
of nets, undercutting 
local sellers of nets 
and commercial 
market distribution.”
Evidence was found that nets are valued highly enough that, even if freely 
given, they will not be resold.  Seventy-three percent of the individuals who 
received nets for free were unwilling to sell them at the maximum price. 
percent of annual per capita income. 
The cost in lives is also high—four out 
of five people in the area know someone 
who has died from the disease. Local 
knowledge about how the disease is 
transmitted is widespread—about ninety 
percent of respondents correctly reply it 
is spread through mosquito bites. Given 
the high toll malaria takes, one might 
therefore expect a high demand for 
mosquito nets. Yet still only about five 
percent of households in the area were 
using nets.
The experiment performed by 
Hoffmann and her colleagues was 
designed to elicit the values households 
place on nets and determine the 
likelihood that freely given nets would 
be sold to other households at prices that 
undercut local sellers. They obtained 
a couple of hundred high-quality ITNs 
at a wholesale price of $7.63—a price 
they believe is close to the lowest that 
a local trader of this type of net might 
be able to charge and still turn a profit. 
After recruiting participants from 
households with at least one child under 
five, they freely distributed the nets to 
some individuals and cash money to 
others; a third group was simply invited 
to participate and given a small sum of 
money to compensate them for their 
time. All three groups were requested to 
offer prices at which they were willing 
to buy or sell the ITNs given to the first 
group. The maximum they were allowed 
to pay (if buying) or accept (if selling) 
was $7.63, partly to reflect that this 
would have been the cheapest possible 
local price for the net.
The people who had to use their own 
financial resources to buy an ITN were 
willing and able to pay an average of 
$2.34 for one net (far below the lowest 
price of $7.63 a local trader selling 
the ITN might be expected to charge). 
On the other hand, among those given 
cash (which they could have simply 
taken and spent on something else), the 
average bid was nearly six dollars. In 
fact, half of them were willing to pay 
the maximum price ($7.63) they were 
allowed to bid in order to purchase an 
ITN from someone else (which means 
they probably valued the net at some 
unknown price even higher than the 
max of $7.63). This strongly suggests 
that the reason households in the area 
do not own nets is not that they don’t 
believe nets are worth the local prices 
charged. Instead, households simply 
have very tight cash constraints. While 
they would be willing to pay higher 
prices if they had the cash on hand, they 
cannot afford the sacrifices required to 
buy a net, given their typical resources. 
Note that a willingness to pay $7.63 
or higher when provided the cash to 
do so (rather than spend that cash on 
something else) implies that individual 
will require at least $7.63 in order to 
part with the net (since clearly it is 
worth at least that much to him). This 
by itself is strong evidence that nets are 
valued highly enough that, even if freely 
O
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given, they will not be resold.
Yet even stronger evidence comes 
from the fact that seventy-three percent 
of the individuals who received nets 
for free were unwilling to accept the 
maximum price ($7.63) for even just 
one of their nets. The fact that forty-nine 
percent of those given cash valued the 
nets at or above $7.63, while seventy-
three percent of those who were freely 
given the ITN value it above that 
price indicates a likely endowment 
effect. Once the net is owned, it is 
valued higher.
Interestingly, they did not find 
evidence that married men and married 
women value nets any differently from 
each other. Among those freely given 
ITNs, married men require about the 
same amount of money as married 
women in order to sell the net to 
someone else and are willing to spend 
about the same amount of cash they 
have been given for a net. However, 
Hoffmann and her colleagues found 
that married men are willing and able to 
spend about a dollar more on nets out of 
their own cash resources, reflecting the 
fact that men generally have access to 
more cash than women in rural Uganda.
Implications for Health Policy
Hoffman and her colleagues found 
that liquidity constraints (and not 
low valuations of ITNs) are a major 
reason for which more people do not 
purchase ITNs. They also found that the 
endowment effect does indeed cause 
people to require substantially more 
money to part with an ITN they already 
own than they would have been willing 
to pay for it. Together, these suggest 
that free distribution of nets will not 
incite large-scale on-selling of the nets, 
which would undermine commercial 
market distribution. 
Moreover, in a simulation of the 
market for nets in rural western Uganda, 
they found that less than six percent 
of nets would be resold. Perhaps the 
most compelling evidence, however, 
is that very few of the households that 
were freely given nets were willing to 
resell them at their true cost (which 
represented relatively high prices), and 
none of the households that had to use 
their own cash resources were willing 
to pay the true cost of the net. This 
suggests that households with freely 
given ITNs would only accept quite 
high prices to part with the ITN—prices 
that are too high for other households to 
be able to pay.
Freely given ITNs thus appear likely 
to “stick” to a targeted group unable or 
unwilling to pay for the nets on their 
own. Fears over “external leakage” 
of targeted ITN interventions to non-
poor or non-targeted groups, as well 
as weakening the development of 
commercial markets, appear unfounded. 
Free distribution of ITNs therefore 
appears to remain a critical component 
of reducing malaria in the most 
vulnerable populations, with little risk 
of the negative long-term drawbacks.  n
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